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UNFAIR COMPETITION. 
I N the recent case of International News Sermce v. The Asso-ciated Press (U. S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 1918), suit was brought 
by the Associated Press to restrain the defendant from its sys-
tematic appropriation of complainant's news, first, by bribing em-
ployes; second, by inducing' Associated Press members to violate 
its by-laws and pennit defendant to obtain news from publication; 
and th~rd, by copying news from bulletin boards and from early edi-
tions of complainant's members' newspaper and selling this, bodily 
or after re-writing it, to defendant's customers. The question as to 
the right of complainant to relief against the third of these methods 
was the principal question in the case. 
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the 
first two practices but, although satisfied that defendant's acts were 
wrongful, refused relief against the third, because the legal ques-
tion was one of first impression and the court preferred to await 
the outcome of the appeal. 
'fqe Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the cause with directions 
to issue an injunction against the bodily taking of the words or sub-
stance of complainant's news until its commercial value as news had 
passed away. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court the decree was 
affirmed. 
The court based its decision squarely upon unfair competition in 
business and refosed to waste any 'time over the questions as to 
_whether there was a violation of any common law property right in 
news matter and whether this was lost or still remained after publi-
cation by reason of the copyright act. The words of Mr. Justice 
Pitney, who delivered the opinion of the court, are particularly in-
structive: 
"Tµe right (he said) of the purchaser of a single news-
paper to spread knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for 
any legitimate purpose nbt unreasonably interfering with 
complainant's right to 'make merchandise of it, mny be ad-
mitted; but to transmit that news for commercial use, in com-
petition with complainant-which is what defendant has done 
and seeks to justify-is a very different matter. In doing 
this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material 
that has been acquired by complainant ~s the result of organ-
ization and 'the _expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and 
which is salable by complainant for money,, and that defend-
ant, in appropriating it and selling it as its own, is endeavor-
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ing to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to 
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is 
appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. 
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthor-
ized- interference with the normal operation of complainant's 
legitimate business precisely at the point where.the profit is to 
be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit 
from those who have earned it to those who have not; with 
special advantage to defendant in the competitio_n because of 
the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense 
of gathering the news. The transaction speaks for itself, and 
a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing 
it as unfair competition in business." 
* * * * * 
"Regarding news matter as the mere material from which 
these two competing parties are endeavoring to make money, 
and treating it, therefore, as quasi-property for_ the purposes 
of their business because they are both selling it as such, de-
fendant's conduct differs from the ordinary case of unfair· 
competition in trade principally in this that, instead of selling 
its own goods as 'those of complainant, it substitutes misappro-
priation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells complain-
ant's goods as its own." 
This case shows the adaptability of the courts tc;; meet new condi-
tions and reveals the elasticity of the -term "unfair competition."· 
The subject matter was news,-obviously mere news is not property 
and it has been held that news as such is not copyrightable.1 Books 
containing information can be protected under the copyright statute, 
but the information itself, as distinguished from the literary form 
in which it is cast, is not protectible under the copyright acts.2 '¥hile 
common rights before publication are perhaps broader than rights 
after publication,3 which are created by statute, still news, to be of 
value for newspaper purposes, must be published, and if published 
without copyright, the common law right terminates and, as previ-
ously pointed out, the copyright statutei:; do not embrace such things. 
There was much discussion in the early quotation cases on this 
1 Tribune Co. v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 76 Publishers Weekly 643, 947· 
Springfield v. Thame, 89 L,l'. (N.S.) 242; Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382; N. Y. Times v. 
Sun. Assn., I95 Fed. no; 204 Fed. 586; Walter v. Steinkopf, (I892), 3 Ch. 489. 
· "Baker v. Selden, IOI U. S. 99; Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. 674. 
•See article by George E. Brand "Property in Notion" I Bench & Bar (July I9I2) 
Ioo, for a full citation. of cases. 
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point,4 but the consensus was that rules of law which had grown up 
concerning literar:}' property and copyright could not be expanded 
to reach and prot.ect news as such. The principles governing unfair 
trade, as that term is commonly understood, seemed inadequate. 
Unfair trade was perilously close to being crystalized and-limited to 
mere passing off. The term "unfair trade" by ·common consent 
seemed to be regarded as an outgrowth or expansion of trade-mark 
infringement. The unfair trader of early days usually contented 
himself with pirating trade-marks and trade names. The courts, 
after·some hesitancy, made this ·sort of piracy unprofitable by stop-
ping it. Then the trade parasite, by various unscrupulous and in-
genious contrivances, sought to steal his successful rival's business 
by ways other than infringing his trade-mark, by the imitation of 
packages, by the deceptive use of personal or descriptive or geo-
graphical names, by the simulation of labels, anc;I in the countless 
ways in which a man is able to make the false representation that 
his goods are his rival's. For a while these efforts, to the reproach 
of the courts, seemed to succeed unjil finally the judicial conscience 
awoke sufficiently for -judges, with an appreciation of good sports-
manship as well as a sense of justice, to realize that trade could be 
stolen in other ways than by the .mere infringement of trade-marks, 
that trade-marks are simply one way of identifying merchandise, 
that copying trade-marks was only one way of stealing good will, 
and that it :was the sale of one trader's goods as and for another's 
which was the wrong and the condition demanding relief rather than 
the particular nieans by which it might be .accomplished. 'fhere 
seemed to be no name for such commercial depravity and for want 
of a better, the phrase ''unfair competition" was adopted. It was 
probably a loose translation of the French expression "concurrence 
deloyale" and because the words "unfair competition" were so com-
monly used to describe the wrong where, by artifice, one trader's 
goods were represented to be those of another, other than by trade 
mark infringement, it became dangerously !=lose to being limited to 
this.kind of unfairness. Many courts assumed that, unless there was 
a false representation that the goods of A were ~he goods of B, 
'Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236; Hunt v. N. Y. Cotton 
Eschange, 205 U. S. 322; Cleveland Telegraph Co. v. Stone, 105 Fed. 794; National Tele· 
·graph New.r c,,.. v. Western Union Teleg. Co., n9 Fed. 294; Board of Trade v. Consoli. 
dated Stock Exchange, 121 Fed. 433; McDermott Commission Co. v. Chicago Board of 
Ttade, 146 Fed. ¢1; See also Sports and General Press Agency Ltd. v. "Our Dogr' Pub-
lishing Co., Ltd. (1916) 2 K. B. 88"'; Board of Trade v. Hadden-Krull Co., 109 Fed. 705; 
Board of Trade v. Thompson, 103 Fed. 902; Board of Traae v. Cella Cd., 145 Fed • .:z8; 
Kiernan v. Manhattan r:el. c,,.., so How. Pr. 194; Gold & .Stock Esch. v. Todd, l'l Hun. 
548; -Dodge v. Construction Informtllion Co., 183 Mass 62; Eschange Telegraph Co. v. 
Gregor.1, 74 L.T. (N.S.) 85; Exchange Tel. Co. v. Central News Co. (1897) 2 Ch. 48. 
UNFAIR COMPETITION 493 
there could be no unfair competition. Unfair competition was re-
garded only as a branch of trade-mark law and causes involving it 
were digested under some such caption as Trade Marks and Analo-
gous Cases. Indeed the 5th Edition of Sebastian's great work, "The 
J..,aw of Trade Marks", published in l9II, treats the subject in one 
chapter under the subject "Passing Off and Analogous Cases," and 
devotes 60 pages out of a treatise of 892 p~ges to it. The first edi-
tion of Mr. Hopkins' Book, published in 1900, was called "The Law 
of Unfair 'frade'', but the second and third editions are entitled "The 
Law of Trade Marks, Trade Names and Unfair Competition," prob-
ably for the reason that the legal profession did not know what un-
fair competition was and the title hindered the same ·of the book. 
Unfair competition was supposed to be a species of trade mark law. 
It was not until 1916 that the Supreme Court stated the proper rela-
tionship of the two in Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 
403, 413, where Mr. Justice Pitney said (p. 412): 
"Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a 
party has a valuable interest in~the good will of his trade or 
business, and in the trade marks adopted to maintain and ex-
tend it. The essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the 
goods qf one manufacturer or vendor for those of another. 
* * * . 
This essential element is the same in trade mark cases as 
in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trade 
mark infringement. In fact, the common law of trade marks 
is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition." 
Therefore, it is now established that unfair competition is the 
genus and trade mark infringement the species. · 
Many cases digested under various captions, such as contracts, in-
junctions, libel, combinations, involving such facts as inducing breach 
of competitors' contracts, enticing employes from service of competi-
tors, betrayal of confidential information, unfair appropriation o! 
values created by competitors' expenditures, disparagement pf com-
petitors and of competitors' goods, misuse of testimonials, 'intimida-
tion of competitors' customers, attempts to cut off competitors' sup-
plies or destroy their markets, bribery of employes, and the like, are 
in reality cases of unfair competition.~ 
s There is a discussion of. this aspect of the snbject in Dr. Stevens' book ''Unfair 
Competition." University of Chicago Press 1917. See also XII Illinois Law Review (Oct. 
1917) p. :n8, and the various bulletins issued by the Federal Trade Commission with ref· 
erence to their enforcement of Section s of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Ar· 
ticle "Disparagement of Property'' by Jeremiah Smith, Columbia Law Review VoL 13, No. 
r, p. 13, and Vol. 13, No. 2 p. 121. 
·. 
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In an attempt to indicate the cases which should be classed as 
cases of unfair competition an article was published in this Review 
in March, 1913, (Vol. XI, MICH. LAW R.EVIE')'", p. 373), entitled 
"The ingenuity of the inf ringer and the courts." In the course of 
this article it was said : · 
"If the law has not yet arrived at that point, the next step 
in advance should be that a trader is entitled to be protected 
not oply against any device by which the good will of his bus-
iness or any part of it is being stolen away from him, but 
that he is also entitled -to the custom which would naturally 
come to him, and that he should be protected against any un-
fair interference with his business by means of which this 
custom is diverted or prevented. He should be protected 
against any act~ by which his custo~ers are taken away from 
him by fraud, actual or constructive, by force, intimidation, 
threats or by meddlesome persuasion, and further, that his 
good wilf and business and the things that he has created in 
which they are embodied should be secured to him against 
unfair (though not 1ieces~arilj fraudulent) appropriation bJ.' 
others in any way that will diminish their valite to the orig-
inal creator. · 
Relief in these cases ought not to be made to depend upon 
principles of law evolved in past centuries concerning con-
tracts, trade marks, literary property and the like, when con-
ditions were different, affairs· less complex. and when parasitic 
ingenuity. was ·less highly developed, but shottld frankly he 
accepted as a thing made necessary by modem conditions." 
·''fl}~ Supreme Court, in the case under consideration, keeps pace 
with modern conditions and protects the honest trader from unfair 
interference with his bu_siness. It approaches the question from the 
point of view: of defendant's wrong, rather than a discussion of the 
complainant's rights. The defendant's conduct was parasitic and 
imµioral. Immoral conduct is usually unfair to some one. 
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